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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The case in the lower court was in the nature of
a divorce action which among other things adjudicated the
property rights of the parties.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court disposed of the issues before it
as indicated in Appellant's Brief.

However, that court re-

fused to address the issue of the homestead allowance since the
defendant and respondent had individually filed for bankruptcy.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant's Brief addresses most, if not all, of
the relief sought on appeal.

This brief will only address

part of the relief sought, namely, that the homestead exemption
should be awarded to the plaintiff and appellant.

In the alter-

native, the homestead exemption should be declared to exist,
and the matter remanded for a determination as to the proper
allocation of that exemption.

-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for divorce
on or about August 3, 1980, which started this action.
After some preliminary hearings in this matter,
defendant filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 on May 20,
1981.
The parties agreed that their home should be sold,
but were unable to agree on how best to effectuate the sale.
On August 10, 1981, a hearing was held and the
court ordered that child support payments cease.

They were

not ordered resumed until at least eighteen months later.
A trial was held on October 1, 1981.

In the re-

sulting Amended Decree of Divorce dated December 14, 1981, the
trial court awarded the parties' home to defendant in order to
facilitate its sale.
The trial court placed certain limitations on how
defendant could sell the home.

The court also dictated terms

for the disposition of the proceeds.
During the interlocutory period, which by the terms
of the Decree ended March 14, 1983, defendant's bankruptcy was
converted to Chapter 7.

Plaintiff then filed for record her

Declaration of Homestead on February 8, 1982.

A copy of that

Declaration is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
On or about January 8, 1983, plaintiff filed a Motion
to Reconsider.

This Motion asked for increased limitations on
-
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defendant's power to sell the home, and for different provisions for distribution of the proceeds.
On February 26, 1982, the court stated during a
hearing that before any sale of the home was finalized, it
would have to be submitted to the court for approval.

This

ruling was embodied in an Order dated March 31, 1982.
On March 19, 1982, the trial court gave approval for
a specific sale provided that the entire proceeds of the sale
were distributed in accordance with a subsequent order of the
court, or deposited with the court pending such an order.
In the hearing held on February 26, 1982, plaintiff
asked the court about a determination as to the proper allocation of the homestead exemption, since plaintiff had filed her
declaration.

The court refused to consider it at that time.

(Page 98 of transcript, page 558 of record.)
In preparation for the time when the trial court would
consider the homestead exemption, plaintiff filed a Statement of
Points and Authorities Relevant to the Homestead Exemption,
dated April 16, 1982.

This statement pointed out that the

homestead exemption would apply to proceeds of the sale of the
property.
On or about May 17, 1982, the trial court executed a
Court Approval of Sale referring to a specific Earnest Money
and Offer to Purchase.

The court made provision for the payment

of part of the proceeds as necessary to effect the sale, and
ordered that the "remaining amounts shall be paid to the Clerk
-
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of the Court for disbursements according to a future specific
Order of the Court."
On May 25, 1983,

the bankruptcy court also approved

the sale of the home, and by June 3, 1982, the home had been
sold.

The trustee in defendant's bankruptcy began collecting

the said "remaining amounts."
In a hearing held on August 12, 1982, there was a
review of the history of the case.
Plaintiff indicated that the issue of the homestead
exemption had been raised but not disposed of.

(Page 2 of

transcript, page 564 of record.)
The Judge agreed that he had never intended to award
all of the equity in the home to defendant for his own use.
(Page 7 of transcript, page 569 of record.)
Nevertheless,

the issue of the

exemption

was not addressed by the court despite being raised again and
argued in that hearing by plaintiff.

(Page 10 of transcript,

page 572 of record.)
Finally, on February 4, 1983, plaintiff again raised
the issue of the homestead exemption.

The Judge stated he did

not chink it was something he was in a position to control, and
thus declined to decide the issue.
pages 650 and 651 of record.)
rulings were to be final.
record.)

(Pages

3 and 4 of transcript,

He later emphasized that his

(Page 36 of transcript, page 683 of

These statements were reflected in the Suoplemental

Order and Judgment to Decree of Divorce dated March 18, 1983,
-
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from which Order and Judgment this appeal has been taken.
On July 11, 1983, the trustee in defendant's
bankruptcy, Anna Drake, executed an affidavit confirming her
position that she would not distribute the remaining proceeds
of the sale of the home of the parties until this matter had
been decided on appeal.

A copy of that Affidavit of Trustee,

Anna Drake, is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

ARGUMENT
Point 1.

The state court should allocate the

homestead exemption regardless of the theory of the case.
There are several logical theories which can explain
or justify what the state and federal courts have done in this
matter.

Each of these theories leads to the conclusion that

the state court should allocate the homestead exemption.

These

logical sequences are as follows:
Theory A:

(1)

The divorce court did not have juris-

diction to allocate the property of the parties since defendant
had filed for bankruptcy.
l2)

Plaintiff still had title to an un-

divided one-half interest in the home of the property at the
time the home was sold.
(3)

The bankruptcy court had no right to

sell plaintiff's interest, and the sale may be rescinded, OR
the bankruptcy court's action was justified by the power it has
to sell the property of a co-owner.
(4)

One-half of the proceeds held by the

bankruptcy trustee should be paid to plaintiff.
(5)

Plaintiff's share would be exempt from

process by creditors to the extent of the homestead exemption.
(6)

The state court should decide to what

extent plaintiff is entitled to the homestead exemption applicable
to her individual property.

- 6 -

Theory B:

( 1)

The divorce court had jurisdiction

to allocate the property of the parties.
(2)

The divorce court awarded plaintiff's

one-half interest to defendant to hold in trust for plaintiff's
benefit.
(3)

The bankrupt estate only had bare legal

title with respect to plaintiff's interest in the home.
l4)

The proceeds of plaintiff's one-half

interest held by the bankruptcy trustee are not part of the
bankrupt estate.
(5)

The homestead exemption applies to

the equitable interest held by the plaintiff.
(6)

The state court should decide to what

extent plaintiff is entitled to the homestead exemption before
payment to creditors.
Theory C:

(1)

The divorce court had jurisdiction to

allocate the property of the parties.
(2)
defendant

The divorce court awarded the home to

to take care of creditors.
(3)

The bankruptcy court would recognize

a homestead exemption applicable to such an award.
(4)

The parties were entitled to a home-

(5)

The state court should decide to what

stead exemption.

extent plaintiff is entitled to the homestead exemption before
payment to creditors.
- 7 -

Point 2.

If the tridl court did not hcive JUrisdic-

tion to award the home to defenddnt,

it should determine the

homestead exemption available to plaintiff (Theory Al .
Cl)

Theory A is based on the divorce court not having

jurisdiction to allocate the property of the parties.
This basis is consistent with a recent case
decided by this Court, Rogers v. Rogers, No.

17570, filed

September 21, 1983.
On page 4 of that decision, the Court explained
that the estate of the bankrupt spouse could conceivable include
some interest, legal or equitable, in all property of both of
the married parties.

The result which followed on page 6 of the

decision was that the automatic stay applied to any purported
division of any of the property of either spouse.
Any actions taken by the lower court in violation
In re Eisenberg 7 B.R. 683, 686

of that stay would be void.
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
l2)

If the divorce court's action actually had no

effect on plaintiff's property, then the bankrupt estate consisted
of no more than that which defendant had prior to the orders of
purporting to award him certain real and personal property.
In re Treiling, 21 B.R.
(3)

940, 942-3

(E.D.N.Y. 1982).

What defendant actually possessed was an undivided

one-half interest in the home of the parties.

Absent dtlY adJudi·

cation increasing defendant's interest in the home, all the
trustee in bankruptcy could sell was a one-half interest in '.:he
home.
-
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However, the trustee sold both spouses' interest
in

the home.
If the trustee had no right to sell plaintiff's

interest, then clear title was not conveyed, and perhaps recission
would be the most appropriate remedy.
However, the bankruptcy court does have the power
to sell the property of a co-owner.

11

u.s.c. §363(h).

Bachman, 21 B.R. 849, 851 (W.D.Pa. 1982).

In re

And the fact that the

sale of the home was approved by the bankruptcy court might indicate it had exercised that power.
(41

If the bankruptcy court was selling the property

of a co-owner, namely the interest of the plaintiff, then onehalf of the proceeds held by the trustee would be the property
of the plaintiff.

Brown v. Brown, 189 S.W. 921, 923 lKy. 1916)_;

Mangus v. Miller, 317 U.S. 178, 185, 63 S.Ct. 182, 185, 87 L.
Ed. 169 ( 1942).
l5)

Since that one-half has not been adjudicated to

be included in the bankrupt estate, then it is property of the
plaintiff consisting of proceeds of the sale of a home against
which a declaration of homestead had been properly filed.
Section 78-23-4 Utah Code Annotated.
(6)

Either plaintiff is entitled to a homestead

exemption in the full amount declared, or she is entitled to a
homestead exemption to the extent allowed by the state court.

- 9 -

Point 3.

If the trial court validly awarded

plaintiff's interest to defendant to hold in trust for her,
there should be a determination as to the homestead exemption
available to her
(l)

(Theory B).

The divorce court and bankruptcy court were

each aware of the other's involvement.

Yet each continued to

make decisions based on the supposed efficacy of the other's
jurisdiction.
Based on the divorce court's award of the home
to the defendant,

the bankruptcy court approved a sale of the

home.
Based on the integral involvement of the divorce
court, the trustee has affirmed that she will not disburse the
remaining proceeds from the sale of the home until this appeal
is decided.
Therefore this Court could well act on the basis
that the divorce court had jurisdiction to do what it did.
In re Cunningham, 9 B.R.
(2)

70

(D.N.M. 1981).

As indicated in the Statement of Facts above,

the trial court did not mean to award all of the equity in the
home to the defendant.

Rather,

title was awarded to the

defendant essentially to facilitate the sale of the home.
(Page 7 of transcript, page 569 of record.)
(3)

Thus what defendant gained by the decree was

merely legal title, encumbered by the declaration of homestead
had been filed before the decree became fi11al.
- 10 -

This is,

in turn, what would be in the bankrupt estate.
21 B.R. 940, 942-3
(4)

In re Treiling,

lE.D.N.Y. 19821.

Although the initial decree specified that the

proceeds would be paid to the creditors before it would be
paid to the parties, it had not addressed the homestead exemption.

Therefore, the issue was not res judicata and could be

decided later.
250,

Utah Builders' Supply Co. v. Gardner, 86 Utah

39 P.2d 327, 103 A.L.R. 928

(19341; Hansen v. Mauss, 40

Utah 361, 121 P.2d 605 (1912).
In addition, another order was entered within
ten days of the time the decree became final, effectively
modifying the decree by reserving the issue of the final distribution of the proceeds of the home.

This same reservation

was contained in the May 17, 1982 order approving the sale of
the home.
Assuming that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to determine what will be done with all of the funds
in the bankruptcy estate, that jurisdiction will not enable
that court to determine what will be done with plaintiff's
half of the proceeds, since that half represents her equitable
interest, which interest is not part of the estate.
(5)

In view of the fact that plaintiff declared a

homestead exemption affecting property to which she had legal
title, which legal title was converted to an equitable interest,
which was in turn converted to money in the possession of the
bankruptcy trustee, that trustee holds those proceeds subject

-
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to plaintiff's homestead exemption
(6 l

Since the decree which provided that legal tit le

would be vested in defendant also provided that the creditors
be paid first,

the bankruptcy court will probably rely on that

absent a ruling by the state court that there is an applicable
homestead exemption.
(9th Cir. 19471.

Master Lubricantsv. Cook, 159 F.2d 679

Although this case predates the Bankruptcy

Reform Act of 1978, Section 6 of the old Bankruptcy Act apparently
treated homestead exemptions the same way as the present Act, at
least as to Utah residents.

llU.S.C. §522(b).
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Point 4.

If the trial court validly decreed the

the proceeds of the home be paid to creditors, it should have
provided for the homestead exemption (Theory C).
(l)

As reviewed under Point 3 (1)

,

there is rationale

that would justify the conclusion that the trial court had jurisdiction to allocate the property of the parties.
(2)

The decrees of the trial court might be read

to have awarded an equitable interest in the home of the parties
to certain creditors of the defendant.

Thus, when legal title

was vested in defendant, he would have held that title in trust
not only in part for the benefit of plaintiff, but also in part
for his creditors.
Since defendant was in bankruptcy, property
awarded to him became part of the bankrupt estate.

The estate

was essentially property held for the benefit of his creditors.
Thus property awarded to him for the benefit of creditors would
be treated the same as property just awarded to him.
C3)

When a party to a divorce is awarded the home of

the parties, and files for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court
will determine the existance of a homestead exemption based upon
the provisions of the divorce decree.

Master Lubricants Co. v.

Cook, 159 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1947); In re Scott, 12 B.R. 613,
616 (W.D. Ok. 1981).
(4)

When the plaintiff filed her Declaration of

Homestead, she owned the home in the sense necessary to file
that declaration, since the decree awarding title to the property
- 13 -

to the defendant had not become final.

Daly v. Daly, 533 P.2d.

884 (Utah 1975).
Even if the decree had been final, plaintiff's
one-half equitable interest in the property would be subject to
her claim of a homestead exemption.
93 Utah 198, 69 P.2d 614

Panagopulos v. Manning,

(1937).

Therefore, there could not be any type of a
forced sale which would result in plaintiff, or at least the
parties, receiving less than the amount of the exemption
declared.

Section 78-23-3 Utah Code Annotated; Cleverly v.

District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 85 Utah 440,
748

39 P.2d

(1935).
{_5)

It is now necessary for the state court to

allocate this exemption using the same power exercised in
transferring title from plaintiff. 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and
Separation §931 at 1062.

Closson v. Closson,

P. 485, 29 A.L.R. 1371, 1377

(1923).

- 14 -

30 Wyo 1, 215

Point 5.

It is equitable that the entire homestead

be allocated to plaintiff.
In plaintiff's Statement of Points and Authorities
Relevant to the Homestead Exemption dated April 16, 1982,
plaintiff set forth certain "Equitable Considerations"
supporting the proposition that the homestead exemption should
be allocated to the plaintiff.
(1)

These included the following:

Despite being ordered to do so on March 9, 1981,

defendant never made any monthiy payment of principal, interest,
tax, and insurance on the residence
(2)

(about $500.00 per month).

Plaintiff supported the two younger children of

the parties with no hope for any help from the plaintiff after
August 11, 1981.

This is particularly pertinent since the

homestead exemption is intended to be a means of support for the
family.
1041

Kimball v. Salisbury, 17 Utah 381, 395, 53 P. 1037,

(1898).

(31

Plaintiff brought the sum of $7,000 to the

marriage which was used for the downpayment on the home.
(4)

Most of the debts were incurred solely for

defendant's benefit and without plaintiff's knowledge.
(5)

The defendant received a disproportionately

large share of the personal property of the parties.
For any or all of these reasons, this Court should
use the equitable powers to now allocate the entire homestead
exemption to the plaintiff.
- 15 -

dcty of

Respectfully submitled chis
November,

1983.

Former Attorney for Plaintiff

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that true and accurate copies
of the foregoing

(2)

Brief of Appellant's Former Attorney were

delivered to the following on the
Kellie F. Williams
142 East 200 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

_,,_

of November, 1983.

Jimi Mitsunaga
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84021

L;;:HIBIT

3646tib3

A

DECLARATION OF HOMESTEAD

The undersigned, Susan Race, hereby claims a
homestead in the property situate in the County of Salt Lake
at 9653 South 2720 East, Sandy, Utah and more particularly
described as follows:
Beginning at a point which is North 0005•34• East
884.88 feet and South 99059•32" East 165,86 feet
from the West quarter corner of Section 11, Township
3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
(said point also being the i'orthwest corner of Lot
301, Oakridge Heights No. 3), and running thence
South 99055•00• East, along the North line of said
Lot 301, 100.00 feet; thence North 0005•29• East
97.10 feet, more or less, to the Southeast corner of
property deeded to William D. Green, etux, by
Warranty Deed recorded as Entry No. 2693849 in Book
3814 at Page 247 of the Official Records; thence North
99059•32• West along the South line of said property,
100.00 feet, more or less, to the East line of 2720
East Street; thence South 0005•34• West, along the East
line of said Street 97.10 feet, more or less, to the
point of beginning.
The estimated cash value of said property is $40,000.
U'resent' market value less contract balance.)
The above-named claimant is residing at 1311 McKettrick
Street in Wenatchee, Washington 98801, and is entitled to this
homestead exemption as a head of family since she is married
and to her best knowledge, information, and belief, her spouse
has not filed a declaration of homestead.
The amount of the homestead claimed is $11,500, ineluding $8,000 for the claimant as head of family, $2,000 for
her spouse, Robert W. Race, age

__

9653 South 2720 East,

Sandy, Utah 84092, and $1,500 for her three dependant children,
one of which, Tamara Race, age 16, .lives at 2026 Woodglen Street,
Simi Valley, California 93063, and the other two of which,
Jeffrey Race, age

I(

__.!._i._•

and Sharon Race, age _ _ _ _ , live

with claimant at her address given above.
DATED this __::;:__ day of

='.

le c'f1'.

SUSAN RACE

• 1982.

-

L

-

STATE OF WASHINGTON)
I SS.
County of Chelan
)
On this

'

day of

1982, personally

appeared before me Susan Race, the signer' of the above instrllll'ent,
who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same,

'>

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at ,
My

1 _,,.

, .'d

1/-[;.

:a Li

Commission Expires:

EXHIBIT

A

c<ge

2

EXHIBIT

B

KEU.IE F. WILLIAMS
Attorney for Petitioner
SUSAN RACE HUNI'ER
CORPORON & WillIAIB
142 East 200 South, Ste 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

IN IBE UNITIIl S'licrES BANKRUPTCY COURT, FOR TIIE

DISTRICT OF lITAH,

CENI'RAL

DIVISION.

AFFIDAVIT OF TRUSTEE,

IN IBE MATIER OF

ANNA DRAKE.

ROBERT WWNE RACE.

NJ. 81-01923

STATE OF lITAH
COUN'IY OF SALT IARE

ss.

COMES l'DW, ANNA DRAKE, as Trustee in Bankruptcy, and deposes and
states as follows:

1.

That she has been and is the Trustee in Bankruptcy in the

above-entitled matter.
2.

That she will not disburse any funds in this case until the

Bankrupt' s divorce appeal, Case No .19146, has been determined by the
Supreme O:lurt of Utah.

DATED this ..JJ.}±_day of July, 1983.
ANNA DRAKE

EXHIBIT

B

page 1

/
SUliSCRIBill AND SWORN to before me tl11s _L{__day or July, 1983.

ITTI'ARY PUBLIC, Residing in

Salt Lake Cotnty, Utah.

My CaIIIlission Expires:

